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We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when votingis costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from smallcommittees tomass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices
of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency
and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments.
Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from
the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games. We find a
tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting
rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information
environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs.
On November 7, 2000, the polls closed in the east-ern time zone portion of Florida at 7:00 p.m.At 7:49:40 p.m., while Florida voters in central
time zone counties were still voting, NBC/MSNBC pro-
jected that the state was in Al Gore’s column. A few
seconds later CBS and FOX also declared the state
for Gore, and 10 minutes later ABC projected Florida
for Gore, 3 hours before the polls closed in California
(Shepard 2001).
Most of the concerns raised after these early elec-
tion calls were about the problems of inaccuracy
(Thompson 2004 is a notable exception). However,
even accurate reports of early voting outcomes during
an election may mean that the election is fundamen-
tally different from one held where voters participate
simultaneously in at least three ways. First, when voters
participate sequentially and early results are revealed
to later voters, the choices facing the voters are complex
as later voters use early voting as a noisy information
source and early voters try to anticipate the message
their votes can send to later voters and how later vot-
ers will react to that message. These choices are even
more complicated if voting is a costly act, requiring an
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investment of time and resources, such that some voters
may choose to abstain. Second, if voters’ behavior does
depend on the voting mechanism, then we might expect
that sequential and simultaneous voting mechanisms
will differ in efficiency. Simultaneous voting can be
more informationally efficient than sequential voting
if in sequential voting later voters are less inclined to
participate or vote to “follow the crowd” rather than
their independent judgments. On the other hand, se-
quential voting might be more economically efficient
when voting is costly if the outcome of the voting is
equivalent, but fewer voters are required to participate
to achieve that outcome. Finally, sequential voting can
be inequitable if voters’ abstention decisions depend
on when they vote, thus the costs of participation are
borne unequally by early and late voters. In this pa-
per we address these three concerns about sequential
voting—–strategic behavior, efficiency, and participa-
tion equity—–both theoretically and experimentally.
Election reporting of early voters’ choices during
national elections in the United States is just one exam-
ple of the many voting situations in which participants
choose in a sequential order and individual choices are
publicly revealed as they are made. The term roll-call
vote refers to the mechanism of calling for individuals’
votes as their names are called as listed on a roll and is
used in many voting contexts from city council meet-
ings to national legislatures. Voting order is frequently
debated in such bodies and in some cases manipulated
to affect the outcome or to advantage particular mem-
bers by changing their voting positions. Another type
of controversial sequential voting occurs in U.S. presi-
dential primaries, where voters participate by state and
the outcome is the result of the cumulative choices. As
discussed in Morton and Williams 2000 many believe
that the sequential nature of the primaries gives voters
in early states like New Hampshire and Iowa an undue
influence on the outcome through their influence on
later voters’ choices. A similar voting mechanism is
used when countries hold sequential referenda over
treaties or agreements as in the recent referenda over
the proposed European Union Constitution. The or-
der in which countries vote is often argued to have
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an effect on the voting in countries who choose later in
the sequence and attempts are made to manipulate that
order. Even more significantly, a growing percentage of
voters are choosing before election day either by mail
or in early voting locations. In Oregon, all elections are
conducted by mail over a period of weeks. Over 22% of
the respondents to the National Election Studies post
2004 survey reported voting before election day, with
over 73% of the early voters reporting voting more
than a week before election day. Although the infor-
mation about how early voters choose is assumed to
be secret, polls and other surveys are used to estimate
these choices making it possible for later voters (or
those who mobilize them) to learn how early voters
chose prior to making their own choices.
Empirical research on the effect of sequential voting
on voter behavior, both experimental and nonexperi-
mental, is surprisingly sparse. Two experimental studies
consider sequential voting without abstention: Hung
and Plott 2000 and Morton and Williams 1999, 2000.
These two studies provide somewhat conflicting con-
clusions about the extent later voters use early voters’
choices to inform their decisions. Hung and Plott inves-
tigate sequential voting with a particular concern for
the “follow the crowd” behavior. When they included
a treatment which induced preference for conformity
with monetary incentives, they observe such behavior.
Morton and Williams find that in sequential voting later
voters do sometimes use the information they infer
from earlier voting and that these later voters make
more informed choices than in simultaneous voting,
supporting concerns about the inequities of sequential
voting.
Although roll-call voting in Congress and other leg-
islatures has been extensively studied, we are aware
of no studies of such voting that explicitly considers
how sequence affects members’ decisions. The only
nonexperimental empirical research on sequential vot-
ing of which we are aware has focused on the effect
of early election calls such as in 2000 on later voter
turnout (see, e.g., Jackson’s [1983] study of the 1980
election). Frankovic (2001) reviews the literature, in-
cluding several unpublished studies of the 2000 elec-
tion. Despite the fact that some of the analyses, like
Jackson’s, find an effect, as Frankovic notes, the studies
either use surveys of voters after the election where
a number clearly have faulty memories (some respon-
dents claim to have heard network calls earlier than
they were actually made) or the studies use aggregate
data on past elections to estimate voter preferences in
the election studied to infer an effect on voter behav-
ior. She points out rightly the difficulty from drawing
conclusions based on the available data. She concludes
that “there is little evidence of any impact of calling
an election before all the polls are closed.” Yet she
notes that paradoxically, “there is no doubt that the
public perceives this to be a serious problem. While
the arguments claiming an effect often are politically
motivated, and the research does not support the claim,
the public believes otherwise.” Is the American public
crazy as Frankovic suggests? Or does knowing the re-
sults of early voting affect later voters’ choices?
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We consider a game with an odd number, n, of voters
who decide by plurality rule. There are two alternatives
A,B and two states of the world: in the first state A is
optimal and in the second state B is optimal. With-
out loss of generality, we label A the first state and
B the second. The voters have identical preferences
represented by a utility function u(x, θ) that depends
on the state θ and the action x: u(A,A) = u(B,B) = v
and v(A,B) = v(B,A) = 0, where v > 0. State A has a
prior probability π = 12 . The true state of the world is
unknown, but each voter receives an informative sig-
nal. We assume that signals of different agents are con-
ditionally independent and all have the same precision.
The signal can take two values a,b with probability:
Pr(a|A) = p = Pr(b|B), where p > 12 .
Although we assume that voters have identical pref-
erences and thus if fully informed would agree on a
common choice, we can think of the voters as having
different preferences over policy goals as given by their
signals, but at the same time having common ultimate
goals as in other models of elections such as Canes-
Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001. Battaglini (2005)
shows that the distinctions we find between sequential
and simultaneous voting also exist when voters have
private values.
Costly Voting and Why the Order of Voting
Matters
There is a natural reason why behavior should depend
on the order of the voting procedure: when voters can
observe previous voters’ behavior, they can be influ-
enced by previous choices that may signal private in-
formation. In a recent contribution, however, Deckel
and Piccione 2000 have questioned this reasoning. They
show that, under general conditions, any symmetric
equilibrium of the simultaneous voting game in which
players use their information is in fact a sequential
equilibrium in any sequential voting game and that
there always exists equilibrium behavior in the sequen-
tial game that is completely independent of the order
of voting.
Their argument is based on the observation that a
rational voter would realize that he is influential only
when pivotal. To see the intuition, assume that voters
ignore the sequential order of the voting protocol and
behave as if they were in an equilibrium of a simulta-
neous voting game. In this case, the expected benefit of
voting for alternative A for a voter i who votes at stage
t after a history ht and an observed signal si = a can be
represented as
U(si) = Pr(PIVi|ht, si = a.) · v
·
[
Pr(A|PIVi, si = a.) − 12
]
, (1)
where Pr(PIVi;ht, si) is the probability of being pivotal;
and v · Pr(A|PIVi, si.) is the expected utility obtained if
410
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 3
Awins conditional on being pivotal and on a signal si.1
The probability of being pivotal depends on the signal
si observed by i and on the particular history of votes
cast in the previous stages of the game, but the expected
utility is independent of ht: in the pivotal event, the
agent “knows” how all the others have voted, not only
those who choose in the previous stages. The voter
decides how to vote on the basis of (1): he votes A
when it is positive and votes B when negative. Since
Pr(PIVi|ht, si = a)v is non-negative, his choice will be
determined by the sign of [Pr(A|PIVi, si = a) − 12 ],
which implies that he finds it optimal to make a choice
that is independent of the history. An informational
cascade will not occur.
Dekel and Piccione’s (2000) result does not imply
that the set of symmetric informative equilibria of the
simultaneous and sequential voting games are identi-
cal, only that the first is a subset of the second. This
result leaves open the possibility that the sequential
voting game has additional equilibria that are not in
the equilibrium set of the simultaneous game.2 The
importance of Dekel and Piccione lies in the fact that it
undermines the ability to conduct meaningful welfare
comparisons between alternative voting mechanisms.
Is there a reason why we should expect that equilib-
rium behavior is necessarily different in simultaneous
and sequential mechanisms?3
An attempt to solve this indeterminacy is provided
in Battaglini 2005, by introducing voting costs. When
there is a cost of voting c and the agent can abstain, the
decision depends on the sign of
Pr(PIVi |ht, si = a )
[
v · Pr (A |PIVi, si = a ) − 12
]
− c.
In this case the decision is determined by the magni-
tude of Pr(PIVi|ht, si), which depends on ht. We should
therefore expect to see rates of abstention that depend
on the history and that increase as the probability of
being pivotal decreases. This strategic abstention phe-
nomenon also suggests that the set of equilibria and
the informational properties of the two elections will
also differ: the set of equilibria are disjoint and simul-
taneous voting should be superior when the size of the
election is large enough.4
1 In particular v · [Pr(A|PIVi, si = a) − 12 ] is the net benefit of voting.
Assume that if the agent does not vote then there is a tie. If the
agent votes he obtains v with probability Pr(A|PIVi, si = a) (i.e., the
posterior that the state is A given the fact that he is pivotal and he
has observed an a signal), and if he does not vote there is a tie and
the policy is correct with probability 12 . As it can be easily verified,
the case in which if the agent does not vote alternative B wins and if
he votes A there is a tie is equivalent.
2 Indeed, exploiting this fact, Ali and Kartik (2006) have constructed
history-dependent equilibria in which voters learn from the behavior
of previous voters. See also Fey (1998).
3 Using a different approach, Gerardi and Yariv (2005) show that a
very wide class of voting procedures, including both sequential and
simultaneous methods, yield the same set of equilibrium outcomes
if voting is preceded by a deliberation stage where the voters can
communicate costlessly with one another. This neutrality result does
not hold if either deliberation OR voting is costly.
4 Callander (2004) suggests that the differences between simulta-
neous and sequential elections can be explained with behavioral
In an election this cost straightforwardly represents
the cost of the physical time and effort of voting and can
also be interpreted as the cost of mobilizing a group of
voters to participate. In a legislative situation the cost
can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of engaging
in other legislative activities–the cost of leaving a meet-
ing of a committee, constituents, or executive officials
to cast a ballot in a roll call vote—–or even the risk
of taking an unpopular stand on an issue. Legislators
are often aware of the progress of voting on contested
matters while engaging in other activities and can and
do choose whether to return to the chamber. The cost
could also be interpreted as a cost of position taking
if we assume that these costs are independent of the
position taken or the outcome of the voting; that is,
legislators may see it as desirable to not take any po-
sitions on issues. A number of researchers have found
evidence that members of Congress, both House and
Senate, avoid voting either because of the demands
of campaigning or a desire to not to take a policy
position (see Thomas 1991; Rothenberg and Sanders
1999, 2000; and Jones 2003).5 News accounts complain-
ing of excessive abstention in city councils and other
legislative bodies and mandatory rules requiring that
members only abstain if they have a conflict of interest
also suggest that these members see the act of voting
itself as costly.
With costly voting, the net utility function of a voter
who votes is therefore u(x, θ) − c: in state θ if option x
is chosen. We assume that a voter who decides alone
would always prefer to pay the cost and determine
the outcome of the election: so c < 12 (2p − 1)v, where
1
2 (2p − 1)v is the expected utility of voting for A (B)
conditional on a a (b) signal. It is therefore convenient
to re-parametrize the cost as c = γ2 (2p − 1), where γ ∈
(0, 1).
The Voting Games
We consider two game forms, which we call the simul-
taneous voting game and the sequential voting game. In
both games the outcome is chosen by majority rule and
we assume that when A receives the same votes as B, or
when all voters abstain, then one of the two alternatives
is chosen with probability 1/2. In what follows we as-
sume n = 3. In the simultaneous voting game all voters
vote simultaneously. In this case, a (pure) voting strat-
egy for voter i is a map vi : {a,b}→ {A,B, φ}: that is,
given the signal, the voter may vote for A, Bor abstain.
A mixed strategy assigns a probability of abstaining
σi(φ; si), and, conditional on voting a probability of
assumptions on voters. He assumes that voters prefer to vote for
winners, so their decision would depend on the voting history. Such
a voter would vote for a winning candidate even if he or she is not
pivotal.
5 These studies examine the abstention or position avoidance by
members of Congress over a number of bills. Cohen and Noll (1991)
present a case study of Congressional abstention on a series of bills
on a single issue, and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) analyze aggre-
gate abstention rates as a function of overall legislative ideological
preferences.
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voting for each alternative, σi(x; si), x = A,B. In the
second game form, voters vote sequentially. In this
case, a strategy is a function vi : Hi × {a,b} → [A,B, φ],
where Hi is the set of histories that voter i can observe.
In this case too we will denote σi(φ; si,hi) the probabil-
ity that voter i abstains after observing a signal si and a
history hi; and σi(x; si,hi) the respective probability of
voting for x, conditional on not abstaining.
An equilibrium of the sequential game (resp. simul-
taneous game) is symmetric if σi(θ; s,ht) = σj (θ; s,ht)
for all i,j and all ht ∈ Ht, and θ ∈ {a,b, φ}, s ∈ {a,b}
(resp. if σi(θ; s) = σj (θ; s) for all i,j and for θ ∈ {a,b, φ},
s ∈ {a,b}). In this symmetric environment there is no
a priori difference between state A and state B: it
is therefore natural to assume that the names asso-
ciated with these two states are irrelevant for the
strategic considerations of the agents. Let us define
Na(ht) (Nb(ht)) the number of a (b) votes in a history
ht; and let H0t = {ht s.t. Na(ht) = Nb(ht)}. After any of
these histories the states continue to be symmetric. We
define an equilibrium of the sequential game (resp.
simultaneous game) to be neutral if two requirements
are satisfied: (i) σi(φ; a,ht) = σi(φ;b,ht) for any ht ∈ H0t
(resp. σi(φ; a) = σi(φ;b)); and (ii) Pr(θ|ht) = Pr(θ|ht+1)
for any ht ∈ H0t , ht+1 = {ht, φ}, and θ = A,B.6 Neutral-
ity, therefore requires that if there is no reason imposed
by how previous voters have voted to treat the alter-
natives in a asymmetric way, then their names should
be irrelevant for the decision to vote or abstain. In our
experiments we find that no significant relationship be-
tween voters’ choices and the labels of the alternatives.7
In the rest of the analysis we focus on symmetric, neu-
tral perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies; for simplicity we refer to such an equilibrium
as “an equilibrium.”
Equilibrium Characterization
The characterization of equilibria in the simultaneous
game is simplified by two observations. First, because
we focus on equilibria that are neutral and symmetric
and π = 0.5, voters never vote against their signal; they
either vote sincerely or abstain. Therefore, to charac-
terize the equilibrium we only need to determine the
abstention probabilities, {σi(φ; si)}3i=1. Second, neutral-
ity implies that σi(φ; a) = σi(φ;b) = σi(φ), and symme-
try implies σi(φ) = σj (φ) = σ(φ) for all i,j . Therefore
we can focus on one variable only: σ(φ), and we drop
the dependence on φ, simply writing it as σ.
The equilibrium value of σ is determined by the cost
of voting c and the equilibrium expected benefit of
voting, which is balanced against the expected utility
of not voting, so the usual cost-benefit calculus applies
6 Clearly the second requirement is not implied by the first only out
of equilibrium.
7 It is worth pointing out that non-neutral equilibria exist for some
voting costs, but we see no evidence of this kind of behavior in our
experiment. Reaching such an equilibrium would require some form
of preplay coordination, so that it is common knowledge among
all three voters that an abstention by the first voter implies an a
signal. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2005) explicitly construct an
example of a non-neutral perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
by conditioning on pivotal events. Consider voter i
with a signal si = a. His vote is pivotal only in three
events. First, when no other voter participates, event
P0. This event occurs with probability σ2; and, in this
event, the expected benefit of voting for A is equal to
pv and the expected benefit of not voting is simply 12 .
Hence the expected gain from voting in eventP0 equals
1
2 (2p − 1)v, where p is the posterior probability of
state A after one signal a. Second, a voter is pivotal
when exactly one other player votes, and this player
votes B, event P1. In this case, however, the poste-
rior is 12 because in P1 there are exactly two oppo-
site signals that offset on the other, so the expected
gain from voting is 0. The third possibility is when
the two other voters vote, and they vote for opposite
alternatives, event P2. In this case, voter i knows that
there are two a signals and one b signal. The poste-
rior is Pr(A|a,P2) =
1
2 p
2(1−p)
1
2 p
2(1−p)+ 12 p(1−p)2
= p, and the ex-
pected benefit of voting is, again, 12 (2p − 1)v. From the
point of view of i, this event occurs with probability:
Pr(P2|a) = 2(1 − σ)2p(1 − p). The expected utility of
voting for A for agent i is therefore
u(vote A |a ) ≡ EU(σ)
= 1
2
(2p − 1)v[σ2 + 2(1 − σ)2p(1 − p)].
(2)
Comparing with the cost of voting we have a pure strat-
egy equilibrium in which all agents vote when EU(0) =
(2p − 1)p(1 − p)v > c; and we have a mixed equilib-
rium at any value of σ ∈ (0, 1), such that EU(σ) = c.
Using these conditions we can characterize the set of
symmetric equilibria in the simultaneous game.
Proposition 1. In the simultaneous voting game, when
n = 3:
i. If c ∈ [0, p(1−p)(2p−1)1+2p(1−p) v) there is a unique pure strat-
egy equilibrium σ∗ = 0.
ii. If c ∈ [ p(1−p)(2p−1)1+2p(1−p) v,p(1 − p)(2p − 1)v] there are
three equilibria: one pure strategy equilibrium
σ∗ = 0, and two mixed strategy equilibria.
iii. If c ∈ (p(1 − p)(2p − 1)v, 12 (2p − 1)v), there is a
unique mixed strategy equilibrium σ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
In the sequential game the action of an agent affects
the outcome in two ways. First, we have a direct effect:
given the vote of the others, a vote in favor of an option
increases its plurality. But the vote of early voters has
an indirect influence on later voters as well: the vote
signals the voter’s information to the remaining voters.
This allows information to be leaked in a way that is
not possible with simultaneous voting, and this leak-
age may lead to efficiency gains because later voters
will rationally (and efficiently) abstain after some se-
quences of decisions by earlier voters. We focus on sin-
cere equilibria in which no voter votes against his own
signals. Although there can exist equilibria where early
voters vote against their signals, they are intuitively
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implausible, inefficient, and not observed in our exper-
iments.8 At least one sincere equilibrium always exists,
and it is unique in the three-voter case we are consid-
ering here. The following proposition summarizes the
unique path of equilibrium play as a function of the
voting cost and informativeness of the signal.9
Proposition 2. In the sequential voting game, when
n = 3 there exists a unique sincere, neutral equilibrium
path, for all voting costs, and this equilibrium is in pure
strategies. The equilibrium path is as follows:
i. If c ∈ [0,p(1 − p)2p − 1)v], the first voter votes
(sincerely), the second voter votes only if the first
voter has voted and he has a different signal than
the first voter; and the last voter only if the first and
second voters vote for opposite alternatives or if
no voter votes before. All voters vote informatively
when they vote;
ii. If c ∈ [p(1 − p)(2p − 1)v, 12 (2p − 1)v], the first
and second voters abstain and the third voter votes
(sincerely).
Theoretical Implications for Efficiency and
Equity
Propositions 1 and 2 present a clear characterization of
the equilibria. When c < p(1−p)(2p−1)v1+2p(1−p) and c > p(1 − p)
(2p − 1)v, we have a unique equilibrium in both the
simultaneous and in the sequential models, and these
equilibria are different. In particular:
 When c < p(1−p)(2p−1)v1+2p(1−p) there is a unique equilibrium
of the simultaneous game in which the voters vote
informatively and never abstain. In the sequential
game there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies
as described in point i of Proposition 2.
 When c > p(1 − p)(2p − 1)v, there is a unique equi-
librium of the simultaneous game in which the voters
abstain with probability EU−1(c) ∈ (0, 1) and vote
informatively with the complementary probability.
In the sequential game there is a unique equilib-
rium in pure strategies in which only the last voter
votes in equilibrium, as described in point ii of
Proposition 2.
In the rest of the paper we focus on parameters only
in these two regions to avoid multiplicity of equilibria.
We refer to the first case as the low-cost case and to
the second case as the high-cost case. Given this, we
should expect very different behavior between simul-
taneous and sequential elections, and given the voting
mechanism between low and high costs. In particular:
 In simultaneous elections, we should expect the
probability of abstention to be decreasing in the cost
8 Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2005) show with an example that
insincere equilibria may exist.
9 Off the equilibrium path behavior is more complicated and we
present our predictions for these situations in the context of our
experiments in Table 3.
of voting: the probability should be zero in the low-
cost region and positive in the high-cost region.
 In sequential elections with low costs, the first voter
should always vote and late voters should vote only
if they find it optimal to correct the choice of earlier
voters and if they are pivotal. In sequential elec-
tions with high costs the opposite should occur—–they
should be characterized by free riding from early vot-
ers who should abstain counting on the participation
of late votes.
These differences have an impact on the theoretical
efficiency and equity properties of the voting mecha-
nisms as well as noted above. With respect to equity, in
a symmetric equilibrium under simultaneous voting all
voters obtain the same expected utility, in the sequen-
tial mechanism expected utility depends on the stage
in which the agent votes. When the cost is low and
the later voters free ride, early voters receive a lower
utility level than later voters; in a high-cost regime, on
the contrary, early voters free ride on the participation
of later voters and obtain higher expected utility. The
predictions with respect to efficiency will be discussed
in greater details where we develop the appropriate
benchmark case for efficiency: here we note that when
the cost is low we should expect lower abstention than
with high voting costs: therefore, we should expect a
more efficient collective choice when the cost of voting
is low.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiments were conducted at the Princeton
Laboratory for Experimental Social Science and sub-
jects were registered students at Princeton University.
All the laboratory experiments used p = 0.75 and
v = 40 cents. We used two different treatments for the
cost of voting: c = 8 cents and c = 2 cents. These pa-
rameters were selected such that under each voting
mechanism there are unique equilibrium predictions;
thus we have distinctive predictions about voter behav-
ior, efficiency, and equity. Six sessions were conducted,
each with either 9 or 12 subjects.10 Each subject partic-
ipated in exactly one session. Each session was divided
into two half-sessions with different treatments, each
of which lasted for 20 rounds for a total of 40 rounds
per session. Table 1 summarizes the session predictions
according to the cost parameters.
Subjects were randomly divided into groups of three
for each round and in the sequential voting treatments
were randomly assigned voting positions (first, second,
or third voter) within each new group. Instructions
were read aloud and subjects were required to correctly
answer all questions on a short comprehension quiz be-
fore the experiment was conducted. Subjects were also
provided a summary sheet about the experiment which
they could consult. The experiments were conducted
10 Each session included one additional subject who was paid $20 to
serve as a monitor.
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TABLE 1. Experimental Design
Session First 20 rounds Second 20 rounds No. of Subjects
1 High-cost simultaneous Low-cost sequential 9
2 Low-cost simultaneous High-cost sequential 12
3 Low-cost sequential High-cost simultaneous 12
4 High-cost sequential Low-cost simultaneous 12
5 High-cost sequential Low-cost sequential 12
6 Low-cost sequential High-cost sequential 12
TABLE 2. Voter Choices in Simultaneous Voting Games
Low Cost High Cost
Data Nash QRE1a QRE2 Data Nash QRE1 QRE2
Abstained 0.39 0 0.39 0.42 0.68 0.89 0.68 0.70
Voted signal 0.58 1 0.61 0.58 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.30
Voted contrary 0.029 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0
λ 0.49 0.30 0.25 0.30
Log likelihood 320.91 586.1 263.74 586.1
Total obs. 480 420
aQRE1 = unconstrained λ across cost treatments; QRE2 = constrained λ. Constrained model not rejected (p = .05).
via computers.11 Subjects were told there were two
possible jars: Jar 1 and Jar 2. Jar 1 contained six red balls
and two blue; jar 2 contained six blue balls and two red.
For each group, one of the jars was randomly selected
by the computer, with replacement. The balls were then
shuffled in random order on each subject’s computer
screen, with the ball colors hidden. Each subject then
privately selected one ball by clicking on it with her
mouse and thereby revealing its color to that subject
only. The subject then chose whether to vote for Jar 1,
Jar 2, or abstain. If the majority of the votes cast by
a group were for the correct jar, each group member,
regardless of whether she voted, received a payoff of
50 cents (minus the cost of voting if she voted). If the
majority of the votes cast by a group were incorrect
guesses, each group member, regardless of whether
she voted received a payoff of 10 cents (minus the cost
of voting if she voted). Ties were broken randomly.
This was repeated in the next round, with group mem-
bership shuffled randomly between each round. Each
subject was paid the sum of her earnings over all rounds
in cash at the end of the session. Average earnings were
approximately $25, with each session lasting about
90 minutes.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Individual Choices: Does Sequence Matter?
Simultaneous Voting Choices. Our theoretical anal-
ysis of simultaneous voting suggests that we should
see zero abstention in the low-cost treatment and pos-
itive abstention in the high-cost treatment. Table 2
summarizes the voting choices of participants in the
11 The computer program used was similar to that of Guar-
naschelli et al. (2000) for jury decision making experiments without
abstention, rewritten as an extension to the open source Multistage
game software. See http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu.
simultaneous voting games. Of the 900 individual vot-
ing decisions in the simultaneous voting games, only
17 (< 2%) were votes against a subject’s signal, and
of these 11 were cast by two subjects in the low-cost
treatment. Abstention was significantly higher in the
high cost treatment than in the low cost games (67.86%
compared to 38.96%). As is clear from Table 2, we find
little support for the exact quantitative Nash equilib-
rium predictions in simultaneous voting: low-cost vot-
ers abstain significantly more than predicted, and high-
cost voters abstain significantly less than predicted.12
However, the Nash solution assumes voters behave
perfectly rationally with no error. Given the complexity
of the game they are playing, such a strong assumption
seems implausible.
An alternative approach, following McKelvey and
Palfrey 1995, 1998, is to consider a statistical version
of Nash equilibrium where, for each actor, all possible
actions have a positive probability with the probabil-
ities ordered by the expected payoffs of the actions.
The specification of these probabilities uses a quan-
tal response function, which is a statistical version of
a best response function. Of course, these “quantal”
responses will also be influenced by the probability
distribution of choices by the other players in the game
and so on. A QRE is the fixed point of this iterative
process, just as Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of
the best response iteration. To simplify computations,
we consider QRE of only the simplified version of the
simultaneous voting game in which players choose ei-
ther to vote sincerely or to abstain. The conclusions
12 We also estimated a multinomial probit to determine if there
were learning effects where we find significant evidence that voters
increase the probability of abstaining in the high-cost treatment but
little evidence of learning in the low-cost case. We performed similar
estimations for voters in the sequential treatments and found limited
evidence of learning.
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FIGURE 1. Simultaneous Voters’ QRE Abstention Probabilities
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are unchanged if we use a QRE model where subjects
vote against their signal with some probability. To pro-
vide parametric estimates in our analysis, we use the
logit specification of QRE, where the quantal response
functions are logit curves and λ is the response param-
eter. When λ = 0, the response curves are flat and all
strategies are used with equal probability, or zero ra-
tionality. As λ approaches ∞, the logit response curves
converge to the best response curves, or perfect ratio-
nality. Thus, the Nash equilibrium predictions corre-
spond to a boundary case of the QRE model.
Our estimates of the QRE for the simultaneous vot-
ing games are given in Table 2. We estimated three
values of λ, one where λ is constrained to be equal
across cost treatments (corresponding predicted ab-
stention rates are given in columns 5 and 9) and two
unconstrained values of λ by cost treatment, λH and
λL for high- and low-cost treatments, respectively. For
all rounds, using a likelihood ratio test, the difference
between λH and λL is not significant at the 5% level
(the χ2 equals 2.9). This finding suggests that a unique
parameter can explain behavior of the subjects in the
simultaneous game, even though the Nash equilibria
are extremely different in the high- and low-cost treat-
ments. We find little change in the values of λH and
λL over time, except for some apparent convergence
toward each other (and to the constrained value). For
the last 10 rounds we find the difference not significant
at any conventional level (the χ2 equals 1.2).
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the prob-
ability of abstaining and the equilibrium values of λ for
both the low- and high-cost treatments along with the
estimated values for our treatments. The two curves
show the equilibrium abstention rates for each cost
treatment associated with given values of λ. For λ = 0,
the QRE predicted abstention rates for both low- and
high-cost treatments is equal 0.5. As λ increases, the
equilibritum abstention rate in the low-cost treatment
approaches zero, whereas the equilibrium abstention
rate in the high-cost treatment approaches the Nash
equilibrium prediction of 0.89. The vertical lines denote
the values of λ for both the constrained and uncon-
strained estimations and the small circles the observed
abstention rates in the treatments.
Sequential Voting Choices
In the sequential voting games theory implies two types
of strategic abstention: in the low-cost treatment, the
equilibrium predicts that later voters will strategically
abstain when they are not pivotal, voting sincerely
otherwise and in the high-cost treatment, the equilib-
rium predicts that early voters will strategically abstain,
leaving the choice for later voters. If early voters do
vote, later voters will choose sincerely if pivotal, other-
wise they will strategically abstain. Table 3 summarizes
the aggregate abstention rates at all information sets
as well as our predictions for both equilibrium and
off the path behavior. We pool observations for voters
with a and b signals. In the history column, “S” indi-
cates that a previous voter voted for the alternative
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TABLE 3. Abstention Rates in the Sequential game
Low Cost High Cost
Voter History* Data Nash QRE # Obs Data Nash QRE # Obs
1 .33 0 .46 300 .45 1 .63 320
2 A .39 1 .51 100 .50 1 .61 144
2 S .71 1 .55 129 .84 1 .70 108
2 D .41 0 .29 71 .68 0 .68 68
3 A, A .32 0 .19 39 .33 0 .44 72
3 A, S .80 1 .59 60 .79 1 .72 72
3 A, D .63 1 .59 27 .63 1 .72 35
3 S, A .99 1 .59 79 .93 1 .72 82
3 D, A .69 1 .72 42 .71 1 .74 55
3 S, S 1.00 1 .59 23 .88 1 .72 8
3 D, D .92 1 .59 13 1.00 1 .72 7
3 S, D .22 0 .19 18 .33 0 .44 15
3 D, S .32 0 .19 25 .56 0 .44 9
All periods Periods 11–20 All Periods Periods 11–20
Lambda 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.16
Log likelihood −582.41 −291.73 −593.15 −286.90
Pooled estimation All periods Periods 11–20
Constrained Lambda 0.15 0.16
Const. log likelihood −1178.00 −578.63
*Examples of History Notation
A Abstained
S First voter voted same as second voter’s signal
D First voter voted differently from second voter’s signal
A, S First voter abstained, second voter voted third voter’s signal (etc.)
consistent with the current voter’s signal (i.e., the same
as the current voter’s signal), and “D” indicates that
a previous voter voted for the alternative inconsistent
with the current voter’s signal (i.e., different from the
current voter’s signal). “A” represents abstention by a
previous voter. For the histories facing the third voter,
the first character refers to the voting choice of the first
voter with respect to the third voter’s signal, and the
second character refers to the voting choice of the sec-
ond voter with respect to the third voter’s signal. Out of
1,860 voting decisions, we observed only 27 (< 1.5%)
cases where voters voted against their signal, and these
were scattered randomly across the information sets.
We discuss the results of the table in the reverse order
of voting.
Third Voters’ Choices. As with simultaneous voters,
only 4 out of 620 (0.6%) voting choices were contrary
to third voters’ signals. Thus we find essentially no ev-
idence of “follow-the-crowd” behavior or information
cascades, even when third voters are not pivotal. Ratio-
nal third voters will strategically abstain if their votes
are not pivotal. Third voters are significantly more
likely to abstain when it is clear that their vote is irrele-
vant in both the high- and the low-cost treatments—–in
270 of the 283 cases (95.4%), where voting their signal
would not have altered the outcome, third voters ab-
stained. Theory performs less well in predicting voter
choices in situations where their votes are pivotal and
we would expect third voters to vote. That is, when
both voters 1 and 2 abstain, third voters vote only in
75 out of 111 cases (67.57%) and when voters 1 and 2
votes conflict, third voters vote only in 22 of 67 cases
(32.84%).
SecondVoters’ Choices. The Nash equilibrium makes
the following predictions about second-voter behavior:
in both the low- and high-cost treatments, we predict
second voters to strategically abstain if first voters
voted their signals or if first voters abstained, and to
vote sincerely if first voters voted contrary to their sig-
nals. The decisions of the second voter are displayed in
Table 3, broken down by the decision of the first voter
and the signal of the second voter. As discussed previ-
ously, we find few voters voting contrary to their own
signals, 10 out of 620 voting choices (1.6%). In the low-
cost treatment, second voters abstain significantly more
than simultaneous voters (t statistic of 3.94) and first
voters (t statistic = 5.04). In the high-cost treatment,
there is no significant difference between simultaneous
voters’ abstention choices and second voters’ (t statis-
tic = 0.73), but second voters do abstain significantly
more than first voters (t statistic = 5.27). These results
reflect the fact that we find strong evidence of strategic
abstention when first voters vote second voter’s signals.
When first voters abstain, however, second voters in the
low-cost treatment are more likely to vote than abstain,
whereas second voters in the high-cost treatment are
equally likelly to vote or abstain. When first voters vote
contrary to the second voter’s signal, low-cost voters
are more likely to vote than abstain, while high cost
voters are more likely to abstain than vote.
First Voters’ Choices. The Nash equilibrium predicts
that first voters will choose sincerely in the low-cost
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FIGURE 2a. First Voter’s QRE Abstention Probabilities
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treatment and abstain in the high-cost treatment. As
earlier, few first voters voted contrary to their sig-
nal, only 13 out of 620 voting choices (2.1%). Also
as with the voters in the simultaneous voting games,
first voters abstained significantly more in the high-cost
treatment than in the low-cost treatment (t statistic =
2.99). However, first voters in the sequential voting
games are significantly less likely to abstain than voters
in the simultaneous game with the same cost treat-
ment, and this difference is highly significant in the
high cost treatment (low-cost t statistic = 1.6 and high-
cost t statistic = 6.35). Thus, whereas cost increases
abstention, as predicted, first voters in the high-cost
treatment abstain far less than theoretically predicted.
Suprisingly few first voters strategically abstain in the
high-cost sessions (i.e., pass the choice on to later
voters).
QRE Estimation. As with the simultaneous voting
game, we estimate the QRE for the simplified sequen-
tial voting game (where voters either vote their signals
or abstain); the results from that estimation is also pre-
sented in Table 3. We did not estimate the QRE model
where voters could vote against their signal, due to
computational limitations. As in the QRE estimation
of the simultaneous game, the assumption is that voters
use a logit response function and we solve for the QRE
fixed point of the sequential game. As earlier, λ is our
measure of voter responsiveness, where higher values
of λ corresponding to behavior that is more consistent
with perfect best responses. We report the estimate
where λ is constrained to be the same for both low-
and high-cost sessions as in the simultaneous voting
game analysis, and also report the separate estimates.
Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c display the logit equilibrium
correspondences for the sequential game for both low
and high cost treatments with unconstrained values of
λ.13 Figure 2a displays the correspondences for the first
voter; Figure 2b, for the second voter; and Figure 2c,
for the fhird voter. Note that in Figures 2b and 2c,
the equilibrium correspondences depend on the voter’s
information set with the histories defined as in Table 3
described earlier.
As in the simultaneous voting analysis, we find a
lack of significant difference between λH and λL, and
an apparent convergence over time. For all rounds the
likelihood ratio test the χ2 statistic equals 4.88 which
is barely significant, but for the last 10 rounds the χ2
statistic is less than 0.01. As with the simultaneous
game, this fact suggests that a single value of the QRE
parameter, λ, can explain behavior in quite different
strategic environments. That is, just one parameter ex-
plains behavior at different nodes of the game in which
13 The constrained λ lies between the two and is not shown on the
figures.
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FIGURE 2b. Second Voter’s QRE Abstention Probabilities
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Note: History S = first voter voted same as second voter’s signal; D = first voter voted differently from voter’s signal; A = first voter
abstaines.
subjects are in different stages of voting and informa-
tion sets.
We also estimated a constrained value of λ for all
the data (simultaneous and sequential, low and high
cost). Because we had more observations of sequential
voting for a greater number of information sets, the
resulting λ was almost identical to the constrained λ
for the sequential voting games, that is 0.155. A likeli-
hood ratio test shows that the estimates for the sequen-
tial and simultaneous games are significantly different.
This is not surprising, because the simultaneous and
sequential game forms are completely different. The
sequential game form has many different information
sets and is a signaling game, which requires players to
make subtle inferences from earlier player’s choices.
This has been observed elsewhere, even when compar-
ing two simultaneous-move games.14
Besides providing a much better quantitative fit to
the data than the Nash equilibrium, the QRE model
also makes a number of successful qualitative predic-
tions about treatment effects, where Nash equilibrium
predicts no effect at all. For the second and third voters,
for any value of λ, the QRE abstention probabilities
are higher in the high-cost treatment than the low-cost
treatment.
14 See, for example, Camerer, Palfrey, and Rogers 2006. How to
endogenize λ and to characterize how it varies across games are
interesting and challenging open theoretical questions.
Furthermore, Nash equilibrium predicts no effect at
any history for the second and third voters, whereas
QRE predicts such effects, independent of the value
of λ. This is borne out in the data too, for the most
part. For all three histories, the second voter abstains
more often in the high-cost treatment (t statistic =
3.05). In fact, for the high-cost treatment, after a con-
tradictory vote by the first voter, the second voter
chooses to abstain more often than voting, which is
consistent with QRE, but grossly inconsistent with the
Nash prediction of always voting. The reason is that,
given the actual behavior by the third voter, the second
voter is actually better off abstaining than voting in
that history (contrary to Nash equilibrium). For the
third voter, the positive cost effect on abstention con-
ditional on history is generally not significant, but goes
in the direction predicted by QRE in 5 out of 9 his-
tories. These directional predictions are independent
of λ.
As the previous analysis shows, we can conclude the
following about strategic abstention:
1. We find weak evidence of strategic abstention by
early voters. First voters do abstain more under
the high-cost treatment, passing the choice on to
later voters, but abstain less than simultaneous
voters facing the same cost. First voters respond
significantly to expected utility gains from voting.
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FIGURE 2c. Third Voter’s QRE Abstention Probabilities
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Note: History S, D refers to case where first voter voted same as third voter’s signal and second voter voted differently from third voter’s
signal; other cases similarly interpreted; A = abstention.
2. We find strong evidence of strategic abstention
by later (third) voters when they are not pivotal
and second voters “passing” on voting when first
voters’ choices agree with their signals.
EFFICIENCY OF THE VOTING MECHANISMS
Informational Efficiency: How Accurate are
Decisions?
As noted in the introduction, we distinguish two dif-
ferent kinds of efficiency: informational and economic.
First we consider the informational efficiency of the
simultaneous and sequential voting games. Informa-
tional efficiency is simply defined as decision accuracy,
without consideration for the deadweight loss of voting
costs. What fraction of the time does the committee
make the right decision?
To answer this question and allow comparison with a
benchmark, we construct two indices of accuracy. The
“optimal” voting mechanism from the standpoint of in-
formational efficiency is a full information mechanism,
where all voters always vote their signal. For the param-
eters of our experiment, the best the committee can do
on average is to vote correctly with ex ante probability
27
32 = .84. Conditional on the actual signal draws, the
best possible decision accuracies are (.96, .75) depend-
ing on whether three or two of the committee member’s
signals agreed with each other, respectively. Using this
as a benchmark, we compute an empirical measure of
decision accuracy (DA) for each treatment and each
combination of signals for both the predicted Nash
equilibrium strategies and the actual strategies used in
the experiment. DA is the fraction of actual decisions
that match the decision that would have been made in
the full information mechanism, given the committee
members’ actual signal draws.15
Table 4 presents comparisons of informational ef-
ficiency across treatments according to whether vot-
ing is sequential or simultaneous, by computing the
difference in scores (DA). In the Nash equilibrium,
decision accuracy should depend on both costs and the
voting mechanism. When we hold the voting mecha-
nism constant, we expect that an increase in cost should
decrease informational efficiency except when three
signals agree and voting is sequential. Not surprisingly,
15 The choice of a benchmark does not affect our results. Other
benchmarks yield similar conclusions.
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TABLE 4. Statistical Comparisons of Efficiency
Informational Efficiency—–Comparisons of DA
Cases Comparison Nash Data p qFDR
All Cases Low seq.>Low sim. .003 .05 0.05 0.034
High seq.>High sim. .16 .05 0.08 0.04
3 Sigs. agree Low seq.>Low sim. 0 .05∗ 0.02 0.03
High seq.>High sim. .32 .09∗ 0.01 0.03
2 Sigs. agree Low seq.>Low sim. 0 .05 0.14 0.05
High seq.>High sim. .04 .02 0.31 0.05
Economic Efficiency—–Comparisons of Net Exp. Ben. Differences
All Cases Low seq.>Low sim. −2.35 5.76∗ 0.02 0.04
High seq.>High sim. 18.24 3.43 0.12 0.05
3 Sigs. agree Low seq.>Low sim. 4 6.79∗∗ 0.01 0.03
High seq.>High sim. 43.28 9.63∗∗ 0.01 0.04
2 Sigs. agree Low seq.>Low sim. −7.33 4.37 0.09 0.04
High seq.>High sim. 0.15 −0.46 0.55 0.05
Note: seq., sequential; sim., simultaneous.
∗p  qFDR, reject null hypothesis of no difference (assuming independent tests).∗∗ Significant for multiple dependencies across tests.
we find significant support for this prediction in our
comparisons, which are omitted from the table. When
voting costs are low, both sequential and simultaneous
voting should have almost the same informational ef-
ficiency (a slight difference is predicted when we com-
bine across all signal realizations because of differences
in signal realizations in the treatments), but when vot-
ing costs are high, sequential voting should provide
more informational efficiency. We test the five possi-
ble comparisons for all signal configurations as well as
cases broken down by the distribution of signals for 15
total comparisons (the comparisons reported and not
reported). Because the probability of false significance
is higher when making such multiple comparisons,
we used the nonparametric procedure described by
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Define q∗ as the de-
sired minimum false discovery rate or FDR. If we
rank the comparisons by their corresponding p-values,
where 1 denotes the smallest and 15 the greatest and
the rank is denoted by i, Benjamini and Hochberg show
that rejection of only null hypotheses such that the p-
value is less than ( i15 )q
∗ (which we label the qFDR value
in Table 4) controls the FDR at q∗ when the test statis-
tics are independent. Benjamini and Hochberg (2001)
further show that rejection of only null hypotheses such
that the p-value is less than (
i
15 )q
∗∑
i
1
i
controls the FDR at
q∗ when the tests have dependencies. We report results
using both procedures in Table 4 (q∗ = 0.05).
We find mixed results in our comparisons of se-
quential and simultaneous voting on informational ef-
ficiency. As expected, we find that in the low-cost case,
there is no significant difference between sequential
and simultaneous informational efficiency except when
all three signals agree and sequential voting is slightly
more efficient, although the result is only significant if
we assume that the multiple tests are independent and
the magnitude of the difference is very small (0.05).
The effect is due to greater than equilibrium abstention
by low-cost voters in simultaneous voting. However,
although we expect that in the high-cost case there will
be a significant difference between sequential and si-
multaneous informational efficiency, we again find only
a significant difference when all three signals agree and
only if we assume that the multiple tests are indepen-
dent. This reflects the fact that high-cost voters vote
more frequently than predicted in simultaneous vot-
ing. Our results suggest that informational efficiency
is somewhat affected by the predicted variables but
is also affected by behavioral factors that lead voters
to diverge from Nash equilibrium predictions and, as
we found earlier, is better explained by the quantal
response model.
Economic Efficiency
We use as a benchmark in evaluating economic ef-
ficiency the total expected payoffs received by the
groups. To compare the differences in economic effi-
ciency between the sequential and simultaneous vot-
ing mechanisms with their predicted differences we
calculated the predicted net expected group payoffs
given the realized signals and expected Nash equilib-
rium behavior. Note that these are calculated before
the realization of the state A or B so that any ran-
domness in the state, conditional on signal draws, that
might benefit a particular treatment, does not affect
our comparisons. Furthermore, we calculated the pay-
offs received using the frequency of signal realizations
and before the realization of the state in the same way.
Finally, as with informational efficiency, we calculated
the efficiency measure for the two different signal con-
figurations (three agree and two agree). Similarly, we
calculated the actual net expected group payoffs in
the same fashion. Table 4 also presents the predicted
differences in net expected benefits and our statisti-
cal comparisons (again we only report comparisons of
voting mechanisms as the comparisons between low-
and high-cost treatments are, although highly signifi-
cant and in the predicted directions, not surprising).
As with informational differences, we controlled for a
false rejection rate of 0.05 under both the assumption
that the multiple test statistics are independent and that
they are dependent.
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In general, the Nash predicted differences in eco-
nomic efficiency are supported by the comparisons and
we find stronger differences in economic efficiency be-
tween the voting mechanisms than for informational
efficiency. The Nash equilibrium predictions on the
effects of voting mechanism on economic efficiency
are different from those with respect to informational
efficiency. That is, when three signals agree, sequential
voting is predicted to be more economically efficient
than the simultaneous mechanism, greatly so when vot-
ing costs are high. We find significant support for these
predictions. But when only two signals agree, simul-
taneous voting is predicted to be more economically
efficient when voting costs are low and very little dif-
ference in economic efficiency by voting mechanism is
predicted when voting costs are high in this situation.
In our empirical analysis, we find no significant differ-
ence by voting mechanism when only two signals agree
regardless of the cost of voting. Again, these diver-
gences from the Nash equilibrium prediction support
the quantal response model of voter behavior as voters
vote more than predicted when voting costs are high
and less than predicted in the low-cost case.
Summarizing, the two main findings about efficiency
are:
1. Sequential voting is slightly more information-
ally and economically efficient than simultaneous
voting for both high and low voting costs, but
the difference is only significant when all three
signals agree and, in the case of informational
efficiency, if we assume that the multiple tests are
independent.
2. The most informationally efficient outcomes are
observed in the low-cost sequential voting game,
and the least informationally efficient in the high-
cost simultaneous game. The difference in effi-
ciency between the two is estimated to be 13
percentage points across all cases, 17 percentage
points when all three signals agree, and 12 per-
centage points when only two signals agree.
EQUITY AND VOTING ORDER
Later voters may have an unfair advantage over earlier
voters because they abstain more, even in the high-
cost treatment where early voters are theoretically
predicted to abstain strategically. As noted earlier, the
inequity we address is inequity caused by the ability
of voters to “free ride” on the participation of other
voters and not inequities caused because policy out-
comes may be more representative of the choices of
those who participate. Is sequential voting inequitable
in this sense? Do later voters earn greater payoffs?
In Table 5 we compare the expected mean payoffs in
sequential voting by voter position and treatment with
the Nash predicted differences, again controlling for
a false discovery rate (q∗ = 0.05) and for both inde-
pendent tests and multiple dependencies. We find that
there are significant differences between voter payoffs
in the sequential voting games, second and third vot-
ers are significantly better off first voters in the low-
and high-cost treatments, and third voters make signif-
icantly more than second voters in the low-cost treat-
ment. Thus, we find significant evidence that sequential
voting procedures in this setting favor later voters. We
also find significant evidence that second and third vot-
ers make more on average than simultaneous voters
in the low-cost treatment and in the high-cost treat-
ment when three signals agree. Thus, being later in the
voter order provides a greater expected payoff than in
simultaneous voting.
We also find that some of the Nash predicted differ-
ences in payoffs are not supported in the data largely
because of the divergence from Nash behavior in ab-
stention decisions. In the high-cost treatment, first and
second voters are predicted in the Nash equilibrium
to make significantly more than simultaneous voters.
However, because first voters vote more than pre-
dicted, there is no significant difference between these
payoffs. Furthermore, first voters actually made sig-
nificantly less than second and third voters, which is
contrary to the Nash prediction but consistent with the
quantal response model.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many voting situations from school board meetings
to referenda on the European Union’s Constitution
to mass elections in the United States are not si-
multaneous. The choices made by earlier voters are
often known to those who vote later in the sequence.
Despite popular perception that sequence matters in
these voting situations, there has been little theoret-
ical or empirical study of the effect of sequence on
voter information and the outcomes of voting. In this
paper we provide a theoretical and experimental ex-
amination of the two systems under costly voting. Our
theory suggests that when the cost of voting is low, early
voters should participate and later voters should only
participate if their votes are pivotal; that is, they should
strategically abstain when not pivotal. In contrast, our
theory suggests that when the cost of voting is high,
we are likely to observe strategic abstention by early
voters as they “pass” the decision on to later voters.
Our experiment allowed us to directly measure the
effect of sequence on voter choices, including absten-
tion, controlling for voter preferences and information,
which is difficult using naturally occurring data. The
results support the theoretical predictions in general.
Not surprisingly, in simultaneous voting abstention in-
creases with voting costs. However, we found that in
simultaneous voting elections abstention is higher than
predicted when costs are low and lower than predicted
when costs are high, consistent with QRE. We largely
found support for our comparative static predictions in
sequential voting elections. There were two surprising
findings: early voters abstain less than predicted when
voting costs are high; late voters abstain more than
predicted when their votes could be pivotal in both the
low- and high-cost treatments.
We also considered the efficiency of sequential ver-
sus simultaneous voting when voting is costly. We found
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TABLE 5. Statistical Comparisons of Equity
Difference
Cost Cases Comparison Nash Actual p qFDR
Low All Voter 1>Voter 2 −1.6 −0.4∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 1>Voter 3 −2 −0.77∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 1>Sim. 0.16 1.54 0.04 0.03
Voter 2>Voter 3 0 −0.37∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 2>Sim. 1.76 1.94∗ 0.02 0.03
Voter 3>Sim. 1.76 2.31∗∗ 0.01 0.02
3 Sigs agree Voter 1>Voter 2 −2 −0.64∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 1>Voter 3 −2 −1.21∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 1>Sim. 0 1.65 0.032 0.031
Voter 2>Voter 3 0 −0.57∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 2>Sim. 2 2.29∗∗ 0.01 0.02
Voter 3>Sim. 2 2.86∗∗ 0.001 0.02
2 Sigs agree Voter 1>Voter 2 −1.33 −0.24∗ 0.0137 0.014
Voter 1>Voter 3 −2 −0.48∗∗ 0 0.001
Voter 1>Sim. 0 1.22 0.13 0.04
Voter 2>Voter 3 0 0.23∗ 0.01 0.02
Voter 2>Sim. 1.33 1.46 0.09 0.04
Voter 3>Sim. 1.33 1.69 0.06 0.04
High All Voter 1>Voter 2 0 −1.63∗∗ 0 0.01
Voter 1>Voter 3 8 −1.9∗∗ 0 0.01
Voter 1>Sim. 13.54 −0.03 0.49 0.05
Voter 2>Voter 3 8 −0.28 0.19 0.04
Voter 2>Sim. 13.54 1.59 0.06 0.03
Voter 3>Sim. 5.54 1.87 0.033 0.032
3 Sigs agree Voter 1>Voter 2 0 −2.24∗∗ 0 0.01
Voter 1>Voter 3 8 −2.41∗∗ 0 0.01
Voter 1>Sim. 17.09 1.66 0.11 0.04
Voter 2>Voter 3 8 −0.18 0.35 0.05
Voter 2>Sim. 17.09 3.9∗∗ 0.003 0.02
Voter 3>Sim. 9.09 4.07∗∗ 0.002 0.02
2 Sigs agree Voter 1>Voter 2 0 −1.17∗ 0.007 0.02
Voter 1>Voter 3 8 −1.52∗∗ 0.0003 0.02
Voter 1>Sim. 11.05 −1.05 0.2 0.04
Voter 2>Voter 3 8 −0.35 0.2 0.04
Voter 2>Sim. 11.05 0.12 0.5 0.05
Voter 3>Sim. 3.05 0.47 0.35 0.05
Note: Sim., simultaneous.
∗p  qFDR, reject null hypothesis of no difference (assuming independent tests).∗∗ Significant for multiple dependencies across tests.
that although some predicted efficiency differences
among treatments were significant, others were not,
reflecting the divergence from Nash equilibrium be-
havior in individual voting decisions. We found ev-
idence that sequential voting is somewhat more ef-
ficient informationally and economically than simul-
taneous voting. The evidence was strongest when all
voters received the same signal and weakest when
voters received different signals. Finally, we evaluated
the equity of sequential voting. As predicted, there
are significant advantages to later voters in sequential
voting in the low-cost treatment, but these gains are
at the expense of early voters. Although in the high-
cost sequential treatment earlier voters are predicted to
benefit, we found evidence of the opposite effect; later
voters make significantly more. Furthermore, we found
that second and third voters make significantly more
than voters in the simultaneous game in the low-cost
treatment, but no significant difference in the high-cost
treatment.
Our results thus yield mixed conclusions about the
benefits of sequential over simultaneous voting, de-
pending on how one weighs efficiency versus equity.
There is some evidence that sequential voting is both
informationally and economically more efficient, but
nonequilibrium behavior of the voters makes these
differences weaker than theoretically predicted and
the differences are strongest when voters’ information
is identical. In sequential voting there are significant
advantages to voters who are later in the voting order
because they have the option of strategically abstaining
after observing the earlier voters.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the first case in which γ ∈ [2p(1 − p), 1]. We pro-
ceed in three steps:
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Step 1. Consider first voter 3 and assume, without loss of
generality, that he has observed signal a. Only three cases are
possible. If no other voter has voted, or if the number of voters
who votedA is equal to the number of voters who voted forB,
then his posterior probability that the state is A would be p.
The net benefit of voting in this case is (1 − γ) 12 (2p − 1) > 0:
so he would vote informatively. The second case is when A
has received exactly one vote more than the other (histories
φA and Aφ). In this case, the posterior belief that the state is
A is larger than p, and he would like A to win; however, he
does not need to vote to obtain this outcome, so he abstains.
If, on the contrary, B has received one vote more than A
from previous voters, then we have two distinct cases. In
history φB, he believes that A and B have received the same
number of signals. In this case, his posterior that the state
is 12 : the voter is indifferent between the options and would
not vote (given that voting is costly). After history Bφ, he
believes that B has received two votes (see Table 3 for details
on out-of-equilibrium strategies), so he prefers alternative B
and he abstains. Finally, it is possible that one alternative has
received more than one vote more that the other: in this case
voter 3 abstains because he would not affect the outcome.
Step 2. Consider now voter 2. We can distinguish two dif-
ferent cases. Assume first that voter 1 has not voted before.
If voter 2 votes, then, by step 1, he knows that voter 3 would
abstain: his expected utility would be (1 − γ) 12 (2p − 1)v. If
he abstains, then voter 3 would vote informatively, and his
expected utility would be 12 (2p − 1)v: so he finds it optimal
to abstain. Assume now that voter 1 has voted A. If voter 2
has observed signal a, then he would find it strictly optimal to
abstain: in this case by voting Awould not affect the outcome
and by voting for Bhe would reduce the expected payoff. As-
sume that voter 2 has observed signal b. If he does not vote,
then 3 would not vote as well and A would win: his expected
utility would be 12v (his posterior is 1/2 in this case). Clearly
voting for A is suboptimal, so consider the other alternative
in which he votes for B. In this case, by step 1, voter 3 would
vote informatively and decide the outcome of the election;
and the net expected payoff would be pv− c. The net benefit
of voting is therefore (1 − γ) 12 (2p − 1)v > 0, so voter 2 finds
it optimal to vote informatively for B.
Step 3. Finally consider voter 1. If she abstains, then voter
2 would abstain. Voter 3 would vote informatively and deter-
mine the election: in this case the expected payoff would be
pv. If she votes informatively, then she obtains
p [p + (1 − p)p] v+ (1 − p) [p2v]− c.
The net benefit of voting is therefore
[
p(1 − p) − γ
2
]
(2p − 1)v.
If γ > 2p(1 − p), voter 1 abstains and the election is decided
by the last voter.
Consider now the second case in which γ ∈ [0, 2p(1 − p)].
Assume that 2 and 3 follow exactly the same strategies as in
(i), but 1 voters informatively. From steps 1 to 3, this strategy
is an equilibrium when γ ≤ 2p(1 − p). The result stated in
Proposition 1 follows immediately, remembering that γ =
c[(2p − 1)v]−1. 
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